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Chapter 17
Antitrust, the Internet, and the Economics of Networks
Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo*

Network industries have been the subject of some of the most important cases brought
under the antitrust laws.1 Government suits against AT&T led to the 1914 settlement following
the Kingsbury Commitment, the 1956 settlement that barred AT&T from the computer industry,
and most importantly the 1982 Modification of Final Judgment that broke up the largest
company in the world. Other cases involving telecommunications companies, such as Trinko
and linkLine, have reshaped monopolization doctrine and redefined how antitrust law fits with
other parts of the legal regime. The government case against Microsoft spawned the first major
use of network economic effects in an antitrust case.2 More recently, enforcement authorities
have begun to focus attention on the most recent wave of network-based companies, including
Google, Apple, and Facebook.
This Chapter examines the relationship between antitrust and network industries. It
begins with an overview of the types of networks before examining the economic considerations
generally thought to play a key role in antitrust review of network industries: natural monopoly,
network economic effects, vertical exclusion, and dynamic efficiency. It then analyzes the
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For a general study of network industries and the Internet see Spulber and Yoo (2009).
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Network effects arguments also appeared in Microsoft v. Commission. See Spulber (2008c) for additional
discussion.
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implications for antitrust policy, focusing on structural separation and the essential facilities
doctrine.
A.

Types of Networks
There are many types of networks (Spulber and Yoo 2009). Although many of the

examples in this Chapter are drawn from communication networks, for the most part the same
conclusions apply to other types of networks as well. We can distinguish between physical
networks with physical transmission facilities and virtual networks, which include two-sided
platforms with technological compatibility.3
Network industries in the Transportation, Utilities, and Information sectors represent
9.1% of GDP. The components of Transportation are air transportation, railroad transportation,
water transportation, truck transportation, transit and ground passenger transportation, pipeline
transportation, other transportation and support activities, and warehousing and storage.
Information is comprised of publishing industries (including software), motion picture and sound
recording industries, broadcasting and telecommunications, and information and data processing
services. Finally, Utilities includes power generation and supply, natural gas distribution, water,
sewage, and sanitary services. Most of these industries are composed in large part of networks.
Not all of these elements represent network contributions since communications includes
production of content such as programming, and electricity services include the production of
electric power. Although the Transportation and Utilities sectors include trucking and
3

We do not consider decentralized social and business networks. Such social and business networks are
composed of sets of individuals in a society and the relationships between them. These networks are mechanisms
that distribute wealth, transmit information, facilitate business transactions, and form personal relationships
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). According to Polanyi (1944, p. 46), “man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his
social relationships” (see also Granovetter 1973, 1985). The application of graph theory and network design to
game theory is related to the theory of social networks (Myerson 1977, Dutta and Jackson 2003). For a discussion
of graph theory in the context of the law and economics of communications networks, see Spulber and Yoo (2009).
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warehousing, it might be instructive also to consider Wholesale Trade as operating distribution
networks, which comprises another 5.6% of GDP. The Wholesale Trade sector includes
intermediation activities and management of the distribution network, even though some
trucking and warehousing are counted separately as part of transportation. Within the Retail
sector, some large retail chains also engage in their own wholesale distribution activities (U.S.
Department of Commerce 2012).
Virtual networks include networks of buyers and sellers connected to each other by
technological compatibility and two-sided platforms. Such networks include search engines and
Internet portals (Google, Bing), social networking platforms (Facebook, Twitter), online
marketplaces (Amazon, eBay), computer operating system platforms (Microsoft’s Windows,
Apple’s OS, and Google’s Chrome OS), smartphone operating system platforms (Apple’s iOS,
Google’s Android, Samsung’s Bada), and video game platforms (Microsoft’s Xbox, Sony’s
PlayStation, Nintendo’s Wii).4
B.

Natural Monopoly
Perhaps the classic justification for regulating networks is that they have long been

presumed to be natural monopolies. A given production technology is said to exhibit natural
monopoly characteristics if it has a subadditive cost function, i.e., a single firm can supply the
entire market demand at lower cost than could two or more firms. A sufficient condition for
subadditivity is for the technology to exhibit scale economies, such as occurs when a production

4

For studies of two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers interact strategically through centralized
communication mechanisms, see Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Spulber (2006, 2010).
The formal study of the structure of business networks also includes the models of market design, referred to as
market microstructure, as examined by Spulber (1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003) and Lucking-Reilly and Spulber
(2001). On antitrust in two-sided markets see the discussion in Alexandrov, Deltas, and Spulber (2011).
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technology requires the incurrence of joint and common fixed costs that can be spread across
units of output or across multiple outputs.
Natural monopoly gives rise to two policy concerns that have served to justify regulation
of both entry and prices in network industries. The first concern was that entry would result in
cost inefficiencies due to duplication of facilities and the loss of economies of scale. The second
concern was that entry regulations to protect a monopoly incumbent would result in monopoly
pricing in the absence of additional price regulation. Several important developments in network
industries generally have been mitigated or eliminated these policy concerns: technological
changes in network architecture, increases in demand for network services, product
differentiation, and innovation.
Changes in network architecture that have occurred in some network industries mitigate
or eliminate these concerns. To the extent that the scale economies are the product of joint or
common fixed costs, these economies can be dissipated either by a reduction in the fixed costs
needed to create and operate a network or by an increase the total demand for the services
provided by the network. Technological and economic forces have pushed from both of these
directions to undermine the natural monopoly rationale.
A classic example is the reduction in fixed costs needed to provide local telephone
service. Although the provision of local service involves a large number of components, the two
that have required the greatest up-front investment in fixed costs have historically been (1) the
wires needed to connect individual residences and businesses to the central office facility
maintained by the local telephone company and (2) the switching equipment needed to route
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individual calls to their destinations. Empirical scholars have long disagreed over whether local
telephone service was in fact subadditive.5
Technological change has in effect made this debate an anachronism. The fixed costs
needed to provide both switching and transmission have dropped dramatically. The advent of
first electronic and then digital switching has caused the fixed cost of switching technologies to
plummet. The emergence of wireless alternatives to wireline transmission technologies has
resulted in significant reductions in the fixed costs of transmission. The first significant
deployment of wireless transmission technologies was the use of microwave relay and satellite
systems as substitutes for wireline long distance services. This was followed by the widescale
deployment of cellular telephony, personal communication services (PCS), and other wireless
technologies that could serve as substitutes for local wireline telephone service. The net result is
a dramatic reduction in the fixed costs needed to establish a telecommunications network
sufficient to undercut the natural monopoly-based justifications for regulation.
Technological change also has made telecommunications markets contestable by
reducing the sunk costs associated with market entry. This allows competition for the market so
that even if there is a monopoly incumbent and the incumbent firm benefits from significant
economies of scale, competitive pressures will drive prices toward average costs. So long as
fixed costs are not also sunk costs, any attempt by an existing player to charge supracompetitive
prices will only invite hit-and-run entry by firms that gather the available profits and depart as
soon as competition drives prices down to competitive levels (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1988).

5

For studies concluding that local telephone service was subadditive, see Charnes, Cooper, and Sueyoshi
(1988), Röller (1990a, 1990b), Wilson and Zhou (2001), and Gasmi, Laffont, and Sharkey (2002). For studies
drawing the opposite conclusion, see Evans and Heckman (1983, 1984), Shin and Ying (1992), and Berg and
Tschirhart (1995).
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The effects of sunk costs are even lower in virtual networks, where suppliers have lower entry
costs and customers have greater ease of switching in comparison to traditional network markets.
Contestability theory underscores a critical difference between wireline and wireless
transmission technologies. Because telephone wires have historically been useless for any other
purpose, fixed cost investments in telephone wires can properly be regarded as sunk costs and
thus a potential source of barriers to entry. The same is not necessarily true for the infrastructure
needed to construct a wireless transmission network. Wireless technologies require equipment
located on transmission towers as well as the legal right to use particular portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum. Since alternative uses exist for both of these assets (either by other
wireless telephone providers or by providers of wireless broadband or other spectrum-based
services), investments in wireless network technologies are less likely to be regarded as sunk
costs and thus less likely to give rise to the market failures said to be associated with natural
monopoly.
The weakening of the natural monopoly justification resulting from the reduction in fixed
costs has been accompanied by an increase in the demand for the services provided by
communications networks. The emergence of personal computing and the analog modem made
it possible for subscribers to use their connections to telecommunications networks to send data
as well as voice communications. The increase in functionality made possible by the
deployment of digital technologies has mitigated the tendency of telecommunications markets to
collapse into natural monopolies by greatly increasing the demand for the network services.
These analog technologies are in the process of being replaced with digital technologies, such as
digital subscriber lines, and by fiber optics, which are enhancing the value of the network
connection still further.
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The increasing packetization of communications technologies has also put pressure on
the distinctions between transmission technologies, which once made sense when each medium
of communications employed distinct analog encoding formats. Voice over Internet protocol
(VoIP) made cable modem systems a viable competitor to the voice services provided by local
telephone companies, and telephone companies are developing packet-based television services.
The deployment of new transmission technologies, such as fourth-generation wireless
technology Long Term Evolution (LTE) and WiMax, will increase the competitiveness of lastmile telecommunications services. Once the shift towards packetization is complete, all forms of
communications will simply be different applications traveling on the same data network, and
the distinctions between transmission technologies will completely collapse.
This combination of reductions in fixed costs and increases the demand for network
services has caused much of the telecommunications network to lose its natural monopoly.
Multiple facilities-based providers now vie to provide telecommunications to large business
enterprises. In addition, intermodal competition from different wireline and wireless
technologies has the same effect on the residential and small business market as well.6
Product differentiation also weakens or eliminates the natural monopoly justification for
regulation (Spulber 1995). The concept of natural monopoly assumes that products are
homogeneous so that cost efficiencies imply the need for a single provider. With product
differentiation, there are consumer benefits from having multiple providers offering
differentiated products. There is a tradeoff between the benefits of product variety and
reductions in economies of scale. Regulatory entry barriers would favor economies of scale, but

6

Distribution networks for water, natural gas, and electricity have not benefited to the same extent from
improvements in transmission technologies and convergence.
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would eliminate the benefits of product differentiation. With multiple providers of network
services offering differentiated products, consumers benefit from competition among providers
that provide services to address different consumer needs. Competition among providers also
involves price competition. Product differentiation allows markets to reach equilibrium with
multiple producers each producing on the declining portion of the average cost curve, as was
shown by Edward Chamberlin’s seminal work on monopolistic competition (1934). So long as
products are differentiated, the existence of unexhausted economies of scale need not necessarily
force a network to collapse into a natural monopoly (Yoo 2005). Over time, the introduction of
new types of products and services by new entrants generates turnover of market leaders, further
weakening the cost-based natural monopoly argument for regulation of network industry.
Innovation also can invalidate the natural monopoly argument for regulation (Spulber
1995). The traditional natural monopoly justification for entry and price regulation is based on a
static industry with a given cost function. Technological change in network industries implies
that the cost function of network firms changes over time. This weakens the argument that a
protected monopoly incumbent generates cost benefits due to economies of scale. Entry of more
efficient firms will generate cost efficiencies even if there are reduced economies of scale. There
is a tradeoff between the cost efficiencies generated by entry of innovative firms and the
potential cost inefficiencies from smaller scale firms. Competition among firms over time
addresses the tradeoffs between cost reductions through innovative entry and economies of scale
from fewer firms.
C.

Network Economic Effects
Another economic characteristic often regarded as a source of market power in network

industries is network effects. Network effects exist when the value of a network is determined
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not only by the services it provides, but also by the number of users connected to the network.7
The notion of network effects springs from “Metcalfe’s Law,” which states that a network with n
nodes has (1/2)n(n – 1) potential node-to-node connections. In other words, the number of
possible connections increases quadratically with the number of users, and presumably so does
the number of potential transactions. If each new connection adds value, larger networks will
enjoy greater returns to scale than smaller ones (Gilder 1993).
The telephone system has long been regarded as a classic example of a network that
exhibits such effects, since the value of a telephone network is determined in large part by the
number of people with whom one can communicate through that network. The more people that
an individual subscriber can reach through the telephone network, the more valuable the network
becomes. Internet-based communications networks exhibit similar networks effects because of
the benefits users derive from the ability to communicate with a larger number of other users.
Internet-based transaction networks also may exhibit networks effects when users derive benefits
from the number of other potential trading partners on the network.
Because the Internet is a network of networks, it is often said to exhibit network
economic effects, although upon closer inspection the constantly increasing returns to scale may
be limited to specific networks, such as social networks, rather than the Internet itself. The
ability to access the entire universe of customers need not benefit specialized businesses serving
market niches, although there are advantages to serving the long tail (Brynjolfsson et al., 2006).
Moreover, increases in the number of network subscribers represent a mixed blessing for
applications designed to provide connectivity in that broader usage also causes congestion. The
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More generally, buyers and sellers derive cross-market benefits, which may be the result of product variety
and scale effects, market liquidity, and connectivity of communications networks (cf. Spulber 2010).
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existence of private networks based on the same protocols as the Internet that nonetheless do not
interconnect with the public Internet underscores that many network participants do not derive
significant benefits from a larger number of connections. As with natural monopoly, there is a
tradeoff between the benefits of a larger network and the benefits of product variety from
multiple networks (Yoo 2012b).
Of course, the potential transactions that a network offers are very different from actual
transactions. The value of such a network would be weighted by the likelihood of a transaction
occurring and the potential benefits of a randomly chosen successful transaction. Thus, while the
value may be proportional to the squared number of traders, the proportional weight may be very
small indeed. The constantly increasing returns to scale from network effects also implicitly
presumes that each new connection has equal value. Empirical research suggests that the
distribution of value is far from uniform, with network users placing a disproportionately high
value on a small, easily identifiable group of other users (Driscoll 2009, Adams 2012). When
that is the case, the marginal returns from increases in network size will be small indeed (Yoo
2012a).
The problem is further compounded, if the likelihood of a successful match decreases
with the number of potential trading partners, for the usual reason that search costs are high and
more traders can mean greater diversity and greater costs of finding a good match. If these costs
increase rapidly, they can outweigh the benefits of having more members so that there can be
diminishing returns to larger networks. The intensity and quality of meetings may be better at a
small party than a large gathering for example. However, with many people connected to a
network there are returns to mechanisms that reduce search costs. If such mechanisms exhibit
economies of scale, this can restore the benefits of larger networks. For example, with many
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people connected to a telephone network, there are benefits from telephone directories. With
many people on the Internet, there are benefits from establishing search engines. However, these
are subtle concepts that are very different from the idea of simply squaring the number of people
with access to a network.
Some economists contend that network effects can give rise to a kind of externality that
can be a source of market failure. This view draws on the fact that an individual subscriber’s
decision to join a network creates benefits for those who have already joined the network that the
new subscriber cannot internalize. New subscribers’ inability to capture all of the benefits
generated by their adoption decisions arguably creates a wedge between private and social
benefit that may cause subscribers to forego joining a network even though the social benefits of
doing so would exceed the costs. The concept of network externality thus suggests that network
industries may be uniquely susceptible to market failures that may prevent the price mechanism
from playing its usual role in generating efficient outcomes.
The market failure argument is based on the notion that market actors cannot coordinate
their network participation decisions. However, there are many mechanisms through which
market actors can coordinate their participation decisions so as to realize the benefits of using the
services of a particular network. In addition, market intermediaries including the network
companies themselves provide coordination through pricing, marketing, and provision of
incentives for participation such as first-party content (Spulber 2006, 2008a, 2010, Hagiu and
Spulber 2012). Through direct coordination or intermediation, market participants realize the
benefits of network effects and reduce or eliminate potential inefficiencies. This implies that
networks effects do not involve externalities, that is, economic effects outside of market
transactions.
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Another policy concern expressed by some antitrust economists is the problem of
technology lock-in. The argument is that network effects cause markets to become “locked in”
to existing technologies long after the arrival of new, more efficient network technologies.
However, market coordination by market participants themselves, by market intermediaries, and
by network firms again addresses these network effects and mitigates concerns regarding the
ability of markets to facilitate adoption of new technologies (Spulber 2008b). Understanding
market coordination of technology adoption decisions helps to explain the apparent rapid
technological change and the entry and exit of firms in network industries.
Some theorists have also suggested that network effects can turn network access into a
competitive weapon. By refusing to interconnect with other networks, network owners can force
subscribers to choose one network to the exclusion of others. The fact that each network’s value
increases with the number of subscribers connected to it provides a powerful incentive for new
subscribers to flock to the largest network. According to this view, network economic effects
create demand-side scale economies that can be a source of monopoly power (See, e.g., Katz and
Shapiro 1985, Melody 2002). One oft-cited example of this phenomenon is the attempt by the
Bell System to use its refusal to interconnect to combat the emergence of competition in local
telephone service following the expiration of the initial Bell telephone patents in 1893.
Presumably, refusing to interconnect with independent local telephone system would protect the
Bell System’s market share by ensuring that it would remain the largest (and thus the most
valuable) local telephone provider.
A review of the theoretical literature reveals that arguments that network economic
effects inexorably lead to market failure are too simplistic (Yoo 2002). Even if, for the sake of
argument, network effects were to create externalities, a consumer’s decision to switch to a new
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network actually gives rise to two distinct and countervailing effects. On the one hand, the
decision to join a network enhances the value of the new network for those already connected to
that network and those who will join that network in the future. The inability to capture all of the
benefits created by its network adoption decision would give rise to a positive externality that
can cause a consumer to refuse to join a new network even when it would be socially beneficial
for it to do so, a phenomenon sometimes called lock in or excess inertia.
At the same time, the decision to join a new network also lowers the value of the old
network by reducing the number of people using it. In effect, switching to a new network
imposes costs on those connected to the old network that the person switching networks does not
bear. This may make that individual willing to adopt a new technology even when the costs to
society exceed the benefits, a situation variously called excess momentum or insufficient friction.
It is thus possible that network effects could make users too reluctant as well as too willing to
change networks. Which is the case depends upon which of these two countervailing effects
dominates (Farrell and Saloner 1986a, Katz and Shapiro 1992). As already argued, coordination
among market participants helps to address either of these potential consequences of network
effects.
In addition, the alleged market failures identified by some economic models depend on
the assumption that the relevant markets are either dominated by a single firm or highly
concentrated (Katz and Shapiro 1986, Besen and Farrell 1994, Crémer, Rey, and Tirole 2000).
Conversely, in markets composed of a small number of similarly sized networks, individual
networks have strong incentives to interconnect (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Faulhaber 2005,
Vanberg 2009). An implication of these models is that policymakers should undertake a detailed
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examination of the structure of the relevant market before relying on network economic effects
to impose antitrust liability.
The economics literature indicates that private ordering may well prove quite robust in
solving any problems created by network effects (Spulber 2008a). One major reason is that with
respect to telecommunications networks, potential network effects arise through direct
connections to a physical network that is established and owned (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Farrell
and Saloner 1985). Thus, even though individual users may not be in a position to internalize all
of the benefits created by their network adoption decisions, the network owner will almost
certainly be in a position to do so. The existence of a single network owner allows potential
problems associated with network effects to be solved by placing property in the hands of a
single owner and protecting it with well-defined property rights (Coase 1960, Hardin 1968).
Any benefits created by network participation can thus be internalized and allocated through the
direct interaction between the network owner and network users (Liebowitz and Margolis 1994,
Spulber 2008a). The benefits of property rights in addressing network effects extend to markets
with competition among network owners (Liebowitz and Margolis 1994).
Even assuming for the sake of argument that circumstances permit network effects to
give rise to the problems of monopolistic dominance and technological lock-in, other features of
the market and the structure of consumer preferences might mitigate, if not eliminate, these
adverse effects. For example, the market may also dislodge an existing network technology so
long as the new network provides additional value that exceeds the value derived from the size of
old network (Farrell and Saloner 1986b, Katz and Shapiro 1994). This particularly true, given
that, after networks have captured a sufficient number of subscribers, the marginal benefit from
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adding another subscriber is likely to be low, which would greatly reduce the magnitude of any
potential externality.
Heterogeneity of buyer preferences and product differentiation affect the outcome in
markets with network effects. As Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro (1994, 106) have noted,
“Customer heterogeneity and product differentiation tend to limit tipping and sustain multiple
networks. If the rival systems have distinct features sought by certain customers, two or more
systems may be able to survive by catering to consumers who care more about product attributes
than network size. Here, market equilibrium with multiple incompatible products reflects the
social value of variety.” With network effects, expectations of market actors affect participation
rates but coordination among market participants can shape expectations (Hagiu and Spulber
2012). In a growing market, participation will reflect anticipation of the extent of the network in
the future rather than the current extent of the network (Katz and Shapiro 1992, Shapiro 1995,
Liebowitz and Margolis 1996).
The existence of large users may further mitigate any problems caused by network
effects. If a single user controls a significant portion of the network, that user would be able to
internalize more of the benefits of its adoption decision, which would help minimize any
slippage caused by the existence of the network externality. Furthermore, because large users
are in a position to capture a disproportionate share of the benefit resulting from the adoption of
a new technology, they have significant incentives to make the investments needed to shift
towards the new technology (Katz and Shapiro 1994). Indeed, formal models of such market
structures indicate that “the sponsor of a new technology earns greater profits than its entry
contributes to social welfare. In other words, markets with network externalities in which new
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technologies are proprietary exhibit a bias towards new technologies” (Katz and Shapiro 1992,
73).
Determining the optimal number of networks and the optimal timing of technological
change requires a careful balance of the relevant costs and benefits. Antitrust policymakers
should bear in mind the relevant tradeoffs. A single network can involve monopoly rents, but
can also offer benefits from standardization, interoperability, complementary products, and lower
transaction costs. Conversely, competition lowers firms’ market power while increasing
transactions costs and reducing some of the benefits of standardization, interoperability, and
complementary products. Accordingly, some delay in the introduction of new products may
reflect efficiency, not market failure.
The fact that markets seem fully capable of resolving most of the potential market
failures identified by the theoretical literature on network economics suggests that any attempt to
remedy these supposed problems through regulation and antitrust should be approached with
considerable caution. Indeed, it would seem appropriate to insist on empirical proof that such
problems actually exist before considering governmental action to redress them. More detailed
examinations of the facts surrounding the examples of anticompetitive problems stemming from
network economic effects typically cited in the literature raise serious questions about their
empirical foundations (Liebowitz and Margolis 2001, Spulber 2008a, 2008b).
Lastly, even proof of the existence of the necessary empirical preconditions for networkinduced market failure would not necessarily support intervention. Consider, for example, the
manner in which antitrust law would attempt to solve the problems of technological lock-in.
Such intervention would necessarily require the government to replace winners in the real-world
technological marketplace with what it believed represented the superior technology. Moreover,
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in order to be effective, the government must do so at an early stage in the technology’s
development, when making such determinations is the most difficult. Courts would also
typically have to make such determinations on extremely thin information that in most cases
would be provided by parties with a direct interest in the outcome. In addition, decisionmakers
would have to insulate themselves from the types of systematic biases traditionally associated
with political decisionmaking processes. It is for these reasons that even supporters of network
externality theories caution that governmental intervention might well make the problem worse,
not better (Katz and Shapiro 1994, Bresnahan 1999).
D.

Vertical Exclusion
The possibility of market power in one market raises the possibility that a network

provider could use its market power in that market to harm competition in a vertically related
market. This could be done either through vertical integration or through a vertical contractual
restraint involving exclusive dealing, territorial restrictions, tying, or some similar restriction.
As noted above, technological developments have substantially reduced the likelihood
that any network provider will wield monopoly power in many network industries. The same
forces that are increasing the competitiveness of every portion of the telecommunications
industry eliminate the plausibility that any network provider will have a dominant market
position to use as leverage over an adjacent market.
At the same time, the conventional wisdom with respect to vertical exclusion has
undergone a sea change over the past half century. While economic theorists during the 1950s
and 1960s were quite hostile toward vertical integration, vertical integration is now generally
recognized to be less problematic than previously believed. (For overviews, see Chapter 30 and
Yoo 2002.)
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The driving force behind this transformation is the emergence of the so-called “one
monopoly rent theorem,” which holds that monopolists have little, if any, incentive to engage in
vertical exclusion. Because there is only one monopoly profit available in any vertical chain of
production, a monopolist can capture all of that profit without having to resort to vertical
integration simply by charging the monopoly price (Director and Levi 1956, Bowman 1957).
Moreover, it is impossible to state a coherent theory of vertical exclusion unless two structural
preconditions are met. First, the firm possesses monopoly power in one market (typically called
the primary market), since without such power the network owner would not have anything to
use as leverage over the upstream market for complementary services (Director and Levi 1956).
Second, the market into which the firm seeks to exercise vertical exclusion (called the secondary
market) must be protected by entry barriers. If no such barriers to entry exist, any attempt to
raise price in the secondary market will simply attract new competitors until the price drops back
down to competitive levels (Posner 1976). Unless these structural preconditions are met, the
most that vertical integration would do is rearrange distribution patterns.
Since that time, the “post-Chicago” school of antitrust law and economics has used game
theory to identify exceptions to the one monopoly rent theorem under which vertical integration
can harm competition. Most of these exceptions are the result of highly stylized assumptions
that do not match well with these industries (Yoo 2008). Even more interestingly, these models
presuppose the existence of dominant-firm and oligopoly market structures in the primary
market, which necessarily presuppose that both the primary and secondary markets are highly
concentrated and protected by entry barriers (See, e.g., Salinger 1988, Hart and Tirole 1990,
Ordover, Salop, and Saloner 1990, Riordan 1998). In the absence of such structural features,
these formal models recognize that vertical integration may be just as likely to lower prices and
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increase welfare and that the ability of existing players or new entrants to expand their outputs
will be sufficient to defeat any attempt to increase prices above competitive levels (Salinger
1991, Riordan and Salop 1995). The post-Chicago literature has thus done little to disturb the
basic conclusions that vertical integration is unlikely to harm competition unless the relevant
markets are concentrated and protected by entry barriers.
Economic theorists have increasingly recognized that vertical integration could yield
substantial efficiencies. For example, if two layers of a vertical chain of distribution are
monopolistic or oligopolistic, firms in each layer will have the incentive to try to extract the
entirety of the available supracompetitive returns, which could lead to a final price that would be
even higher than the monopoly price. Vertical integration can eliminate this so-called double
marginalization problem, since a company that spans both layers would rationalize the
decisionmaking between the two levels of production and would avoid the uncoordinated action
that would make supracompetitive pricing even worse (Spengler 1950).
In addition, to the extent that the inputs can be used in variable proportions, any attempt
to charge supracompetitive prices for one input creates incentives for firms to substitute
alternative inputs whenever possible. The resulting substitution creates an alternative potential
source of inefficiency, as production processes deviate from the most efficient input mix.
Allowing the provider of the monopolized input to vertically integrate into manufacturing can
allow it to prevent inefficient input substitution (Vernon and Graham 1971). The welfare
implications of input substitution are ultimately ambiguous, since prohibiting input substitution
enhances the monopolist’s ability to exercise market power, which can create welfare losses
sufficient to offset the welfare gains from preventing customers from deviating from the most
efficient input mix (Schmalensee 1973, Hay 1973, Warren-Boulton 1974).
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Finally, scholars building on Coase’s seminal work on the theory of the firm (1937) have
demonstrated how vertical integration can reduce transaction costs. One example is the
elimination of free riding. For example, suppose that a firm manufactures a technically
complicated product that requires significant presale services (such as the demonstration of the
product). Telser (1960) argues that retailers will have the incentive to shirk in providing such
services in the hopes that other retailers will bear the costs of providing such services. If all
retailers respond to these incentives in the same way, the total amount of presale services will
fall below efficient levels. A manufacturer facing the possibility of such free riding can either
rely on a vertical contractual restraint that specifies the level of presale services that each retailer
is required to offer or can vertically integrate into distribution. Either solution effectively aligns
the retailers’ incentives with the manufacturers’. The Supreme Court embraced precisely this
rationale in Sylvania.
Determining whether a particular form of vertical integration will enhance or reduce
economic welfare is thus an empirical question that turns on the particular market structure and
the nature of the available efficiencies. A recent survey of the empirical literature on vertical
integration found that the existing studies overwhelmingly support the proposition that vertical
integration and vertical restraints tend to promote, rather than harm, competition (LaFontaine and
Slade 2007).8 The conventional wisdom has now largely abandoned its hostility toward vertical
integration. The manner in which technology is in the process of increasing the competitiveness
of network industries and the real efficiencies from vertically integration has effectively undercut
the threat of vertical exclusion as a justification for imposing antitrust liability.

8

For surveys of the empirical literature on vertical restraints that draw similar conclusions, see Cooper et al.
(2005) and LaFontaine and Slade (2008).
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E.

Dynamic Efficiency
All of the rationales discussed up to this point focus on the most efficient way to organize

the network that already exists. In focusing on allocating the network that already exists today,
these rationales overlook the equally (if not more) important question of how to create incentives
to invest in new network technologies that will comprise the optimal network of tomorrow. In
other words, antitrust may have to tolerate some degree of static inefficiency in order to promote
dynamic efficiency.
As one noted treatise observes, U.S. antitrust law reflects “a uniquely American, marketaffirming response to [market] power” that “assumes that strong incentives promote efficiency”
and that in the absence of entry barriers, market power “will erode under the pressure of market
developments.” Indeed, high prices can play a key role in promoting competition, because
“where supracompetitive pricing accompanies power, erosion of the power is thought to be more
likely because high prices signal the need, and promise a reward, for entry” (Sullivan and Grimes
2006, 84–85). In effect, short-run static efficiency losses must be tolerated if necessary to
promote long-run dynamic efficiency gains from innovation and successive entry.9 Imposing
antitrust liability whenever firms earn supracompetitive returns would eliminate the primary
impetus for competitive entry, in which case the supply curve would never shift outwards in
order to bring the market back into long-run equilibrium.
Moreover, forcing network owners to share the benefits of their investments with their
competitors or limiting the prices they can charge their channel partners would dampen the
incentives to invest in alternate network capacity. In effect, forcing a monopolist to share its

9

For a discussion of antitrust and dynamic efficiency, see Sidak and Teece (2009).
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network rescues other firms from having to provide or obtain the relevant input for themselves.
As a result, it can have the perverse effect of entrenching a network monopoly by forestalling the
emergence of the substitute capacity. This is particularly problematic in technologically
dynamic industries, in which the prospects of developing new ways either to circumvent or to
compete directly with the alleged bottleneck are the highest. Such a surrender to the monopoly
only makes sense if competitive entry is infeasible.
Although some scholars have asserted that because the dynamic efficiency gains will be
compounded over time, they will necessarily exceed the short-run static efficiency losses
(Ordover and Baumol 1988), this approach seems too simplistic. Whether the dynamic
efficiency gains will dominate the static efficiency losses depends on the relative magnitude of
the gains and losses, the speed of entry, and the appropriate discount rate. That said, a number of
institutional considerations militate in favor of the dynamic efficiency side of the balance. For
example, calibrating the prices needed to implement rate regulation and access regulation will
necessarily require the government to engage in an exquisite exercise in line drawing that
requires a careful and fact-intensive balance of opposing considerations. This is made all the
more complicated by rapid changes in network technology and in consumer demand for network
services.
Antitrust policy must carefully balance these offsetting considerations. The alternative
would be to allow the short-run supracompetitive returns to stimulate entry by alternative lastmile providers whenever such entry is possible. It is for this reason that courts and policymakers
have been reluctant to compel access to a resource is available from another source, even if it is
only available at significant cost and in the relatively long run (Areeda and Hovenkamp 2006).
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F.

Implications for Antitrust Policy
The economic critique has important implications for the doctrines and remedies that

antitrust courts have applied to network industries. In particular, these insights affect the reliance
on structural separation as a remedy and on the essential facilities doctrine as a cause of action.
1.

Structural Remedies/Vertical Separation

One of the most common remedies sought during antitrust litigation in network industries
is structural separation. For example, the 1956 consent decree settling the second major case
against AT&T abandoned the government’s initial request for divestiture of AT&T’s equipment
subsidiary, opting instead to restrict AT&T to furnishing common carrier communications
services. The 1982 court order that broke up AT&T required that the local telephone services
that remained monopolized be structurally separated from the portions of the business in which
competition had become possible: long distance, telephone equipment, and “information
services” that combined transmission with data processing. More recently, the federal
government initially asked the court hearing the case against Microsoft to require the company to
spin off its applications businesses into a separate subsidiary.
The rationale generally given for imposing structural separation is that rate regulation
may encourage firms to vertically integrate into unregulated lines of business that they can
bundle with the regulated service and for which they can charge the monopoly prices denied
them by regulation (See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice 1984, Jefferson Parish (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment)). In such cases, it is arguably appropriate to impose what is
sometimes called the “Bell Doctrine” or “Baxter’s Law,” which prohibits vertical integration in
order to isolate and quarantine the monopolist (Joskow and Noll 1999, Farrell and Weiser 2003).
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A more subtle version of this argument exists when a firm subject to cost-of-service rate
regulation provides an unregulated service that shares joint costs with the regulated service. In
that case, a monopolist can attempt to allocate a disproportionate amount of the joint costs onto
the regulated service and recover those costs through its regulated rates, which is a possibility
given the inherent arbitrariness and uncertainty surrounding methodologies for allocating joint
costs. Shifting a disproportionate amount of the joint costs onto the regulated market also allows
firms to reduce the size of the markup to cover joint costs included in the prices charged in the
unregulated market. The firm’s nonvertically integrated competitors, however, charge prices that
reflect costs and competition in the unregulated market (Farrell 1996, Sullivan 1996, Huber,
Kellogg, and Thorne 1999, Joskow and Noll 1999).
The traditional solution to these problems is to prohibit network providers from offering
any unregulated services. A less severe restriction is to require network providers to segregate
their regulated services into a separate subsidiary and to require that subsidiary to offer carriage
to others on the same terms that it offers carriage to itself. Structurally separating the regulated
business from the unregulated business limits the network owner’s ability to shift costs from its
unregulated service to its regulated service. Forcing the regulated subsidiary to negotiate
interconnection agreements through arm’s length transactions also eliminates the ability to use
bundling of regulated and unregulated services to avoid rate regulation and makes
nondiscrimination easier to detect and enforce.
Structural separation requirements have proven exceedingly difficult to administer. For
example, the court overseeing the implementation of the 1982 decree breaking up AT&T was
bombarded with hundreds of requests to waive the decree’s line of business restrictions (Huber,
Kellogg, and Thorne 1999). These requests often took from three to four years to process, with
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estimates of the total welfare loss associated with these delays exceeding $1 billion (Rubin and
Dezhbakhsh 1995, Hausman 1997).
The logic inherent in this approach suggests that regulation and the resulting quarantine
should be limited only to those services that are inherently noncompetitive. Doing so would
allow competition to determine outcomes to the greatest extent possible. This rationale thus
presumes that the scope of regulation should constantly contract over time, as technological
change and increases in demand open larger portions of the telecommunications industry to
competition.
This dynamic quality of the scope of regulation explains much of the history of
telecommunications policy. As noted earlier, initially the entire telephone system was regarded
as a natural monopoly. As a result, the entire network was subjected to rate regulation. Over
time, it became clear that equipment manufacturing was not subject to the high fixed costs
traditionally associated with natural monopoly and was instead potentially open to competition.
The emergence of microwave and satellite transmission also lowered the fixed costs of providing
long distance service by allowing new long distance entrants like MCI to compete without
having to establish a nationwide network of high-volume telephone lines. As it became clear
that each of these markets was now open to competition, the FCC released them from rate
regulation and prohibited regulated entities from offering them on an integrated basis.
Eventually, the only portion of the telecommunications industry that remained subject to rate
regulation was local telephone service. Over time, even that premise has come under fire, as
wireless has reduced the fixed costs needed for transmission and as computer processing has
reduced the fixed costs of switching. The growing constriction of the scope of rate regulation
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and monopoly power has effectively curtailed the analytical foundations for mandating structural
separation.
2.

Behavioral Remedies/The Essential Facilities Doctrine

Perhaps the most commonly asserted basis under the antitrust laws for challenging
network owners’ supposed attempts to engage in anticompetitive conduct is the essential
facilities doctrine (see also Chapter 23, Spulber and Yoo 2009). The doctrine requires owners of
bottleneck elements unavailable elsewhere in the marketplace to provide other firms with access
to those elements on reasonable terms. Given the economic forces discussed above, it should
come as no surprise that early leading cases associated with the doctrine (such as Terminal
Railroad and Otter Tail) arose in network industries.10 In addition, both the 1956 settlement of
the federal government’s antitrust suit against AT&T as well as the litigation that led to the 1984
breakup of AT&T were based on the essential facilities doctrine.
The central concern of the essential facilities doctrine is thus vertical exclusion (Werden
1987, Areeda and Hovenkamp 2006). As such, lower courts have incorporated into the doctrine
the same economic considerations discussed above. Courts have applied the same structural
preconditions to the essential facilities doctrine: concentration in the primary market (see, e.g.,
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co.) and concentration and entry barriers in the secondary
market (see, e.g., Alaska Airlines). Moreover, courts applying the essential facilities doctrine
consider whether exclusion from the monopoly might be justified by efficiencies (see, e.g., City
of Vernon v. Southern California Edison Co., Illinois ex rel. Burris v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co., Byars v. Bluff City News Co.).

10

Although widely regarded as the seminal essential facilities case, Terminal Railroad is more properly
regarded as arising from horizontal concentration rather than vertical exclusion (Spulber and Yoo 2009).
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Finally, courts have recognized the importance of dynamic efficiency. In the words of
the Ninth Circuit in Alaska Airlines, “[e]very time the monopolist asserts its market dominance”
by denying rivals access to a bottleneck input gives the rival “more incentive to find an
alternative supplier, which in turn gives alternate suppliers more reason to think that they can
compete with the monopolist. Every act exploiting monopoly power to the disadvantage of the
monopoly’s customers hastens the monopoly’s end by making the potential competition more
attractive.”
The Supreme Court offered its most complete discussion of the tradeoff underlying
vertical exclusion and the essential facilities doctrine claims in Trinko. Although the Court
found “no need either to recognize . . . or to repudiate” the doctrine, even assuming arguendo
that the doctrine applied, the Court found it inapposite. As an initial matter, the Court
acknowledged that the essential facilities doctrine “serves no purpose” when the input to which
access is sought is available through other means, in effect embracing the structural precondition
requiring concentration in the primary market. The Court also held that any claim of vertical
exclusion must show “a ‘dangerous probability of success’ in monopolizing [the] second
market.” This language has been widely interpreted as requiring proof of market concentration
and entry barriers in the secondary market before a monopolization claim will lie (Areeda and
Hovenkamp 2006, Kauper 2005).
The Trinko court also explicitly recognized the importance of dynamic efficiency
considerations, noting how the prospect of earning short-run supracompetitive returns can
stimulate upgrades to the network infrastructure. In the words of the Court, “The mere
possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only
not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge
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monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.” Using antitrust law
to require network owners to share that infrastructure “may lessen the incentive for the
monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.” Imposing
antitrust liability on those who invest in such facilities “seem[ed] destined to distort investment.”
The Court did not acknowledge that that denying others access to the facilities created with such
investments could sometimes be unlawful. Its reasoning suggested that such remedies were
limited to a narrow range of circumstances with preexisting business arrangements or when a
network owner foregoes short-run profits by refusing to deal with competitors even when they
are willing to pay full (presumably monopolistic) prices.
In addition, the Trinko Court weighed into the longstanding debate on the relative merits
of structural and behavioral relief when it emphasized the problematic nature of the essential
facilities doctrine in terms of administrability. In the words of the Court, “[e]nforced sharing
also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and
other terms of dealing.” Furthermore, because mandated access affects network elements “deep
within the bowels” of a local telephone network, they can only be made available if “[n]ew
systems [are] designed and implemented simply to make that access possible.” Additionally,
requests for unbundled access “are difficult for antitrust courts to evaluate, not only because they
are highly technical, but also because they are likely to be extremely numerous, given the
incessant, complex, and constantly changing interaction of competitive and incumbent [local
telephone companies] implementing the sharing and interconnection obligations.” The
“uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying
anticompetitive conduct by a single firm” suggested that the addition of an antitrust remedy
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would do little to promote consumer welfare while posing a significant risk of deterring welfareenhancing behavior. In so doing, Trinko echoed the criticism that the culmination of an antitrust
case in such a regulatory decree is tantamount a confession that the case should never have been
brought (Posner 1970, Posner and Easterbrook 1981).
Many commentators have concluded that little, if anything, remained of the essential
facilities doctrine following Trinko (see, e.g., Fox 2005, Noll 2005, Geradin and O’Donoghue
2005, Shelanski 2007, Frischmann and Waller 2008, Hovenkamp 2008). Moreover, Trinko
contradicted the assertions of many commentators that the essential facilities doctrine had greater
relevance in the context of regulated industries (Werden 1987, Areeda and Hovenkamp 2006).
To the extent that application of the doctrine depends on a monopoly in the primary market, the
advent of competition in many network industries radically narrows its scope.
Conclusion
Network industries have exhibited significant growth, substantial competition, and rapid
innovation, including Internet-based e-commerce. Some have argued that various economic
theories, including natural monopoly, network effects, and vertical exclusion, suggest the need
for heightened antitrust scrutiny of network industries in comparison with other industries. The
present discussion suggests that other aspects of network industries argue for regulatory and
antitrust forbearance, or at least suggest that such industries should not be the subject of
heightened scrutiny. Technological changes in communications, product differentiation, and the
effects of innovation imply that regulatory limits on entry into network industries do not promote
consumer benefits. At the same time, natural monopoly need not create first-mover or
incumbent advantages, so that natural monopoly should not justify greater antitrust scrutiny of
network industries. Coordination among market participants, by the participants themselves, by
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network intermediaries, and by network owners suggest that network effects are not a source of
market failure and should not justify heightened antitrust scrutiny of network industries. The
observation that vertical integration and vertical restraints tend to promote, rather than harm,
competition applies to network industries. Again, vertical exclusion arguments should not justify
heightened antitrust scrutiny of network industries.
Our discussion strongly suggests that antitrust policy markets should not presume that
network industries are more subject to monopolization than other industries. Rapid innovation
and firm turnover in network industries imply that antitrust policy makers should take into
account dynamic efficiency considerations in evaluating competition in network industries.
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